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 The author analyses two basic issues: 
 First, has the attitude toward the members of the ethnic minorities in 
Croatia changed in view of the war — and to what extent; and second, to 
what extent the attitude toward the minorities is the variable of the 
“ideological” rift in the electoral bodies of political parties. 
 By comparing the data on the social distance before 1990 and after the 
collapse of the former Yugoslavia, and focusing on the study carried out in 
1997, three conclusions have been made: 
 1. The war has brought about certain changes in the attitude toward the 
minority ethnic groups. These changes are not solely Serb-oriented (with whom 
the majority group — Croats — was at war with); a generally negative 
attitude toward other ethnic minority groups has been on the rise; 
 2. The results of the 1997 study have shown that the social distance is 
not a universal phenomenon and that there are two types of this distance: 
political and traditional/ cultural; 
 3. There are significant differences in the social distance toward the 
minorities among the voters of certain political parties; it is considerably 




 The collapse of a political regime means the disintegration of the cor-
responding value system that, in a way, used to give legitimacy to this re-
gime. When the collapse of a political system at the same time means the 
disintegration of a multi-national state, the inter-ethnic relations un-
doubtedly become one of the fundamental features of the totality of this 
process, both at the level of institutional and political relations and at the 
level of the changes in rating the members of national groups. In the 
analysis of the 1990 elections, we have shown how the attitude toward the 
national to a large extent determined the political preferences and how — 
together with the attitude toward religion — it influenced the desired op-
tions of the resolution of the political crisis in the former Yugoslavia 
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([iber, 1991). Meanwhile, there were some strong-arm attempts to impose 
certain solutions, contrary to the democratically declared will of the peo-
ple, both with the internal uprising of the Serbian population and with 
the outside aggression. Regardless of the complex causes of the aggression 
which cannot be reduced to the inter-ethnic conflict, the fact remains that 
the inter-ethnic relations, the internal national homogenisation and the in-
ter-ethnic hostilities are the most obvious aspects of that conflict that 
dominate the awareness of the peoples from the former Yugoslavia and 
remarkably change the existing evaluations, orientations and the readiness 
for certain forms of relationships.  
 The marked national homogenisation and the intensification of animosity 
toward the members of other national groups is not solely the charac-
teristic of this war-engulfed territory or multi-national states in general, 
such as the former USSR or Czechoslovakia, but a universal phenomenon 
in the countries of central and eastern Europe. This is a value-vacuum of 
a sort and the need to find a firm foothold is generally felt — on the 
one hand, most usually in history, and consequently in nation and religion 
— and on the other in accumulated frustrations which demand rationalisa-
tion, the culprit, and the “socially acceptable” object of aggression. The 
attacks on the asylum-seekers in Germany after the unification, particularly 
frequent on the territory of the former eastern Germany, the strengthening 
of anti-semitism in Poland (though at the time when there are almost no 
Jews left there), the increased tensions surrounding the Hungarian mi-
norities in Romania and Slovakia, are examples of that universal process 
(Held, 1993). 
 At uncertain times — and the changes that have swept over a large 
part of Europe were and have been accompanied with big promises, hopes 
as well as fears — there is a spontaneous search for the meaning, which 
very often means looking for “the culprit” for everything that happened or 
that stands in the way for things to be as we would like them to be. 
“Scapegoats” are sought out (and very often found) who, throughout our 
history have hindered the development of our potentials. Most often these 
are minority groups, on which prejudices — or a priori extremist negative 
attitudes — are fixated, based primarily on a cogent emotional attitude, 
devoid of marked cognitive elements. The word “prejudice” in itself 
signifies opinions formed prior to reasoning (pre-judging). In this context it 
is used in conjunction with certain attributes: ethnical, national, racial and 
other prejudices. 
 Prejudices always go hand in hand with ethnocentrism i.e. a value sys-
tem which takes for granted the superiority of one’s own social group and 
its values in relation to the others. Ethnocentrism leads to unwillingness 
and the inability to try to understand other peoples’ beliefs, culture, re-
ligion, language. Ethnocentrism stems from group-centrism, the need of an 
individual to belong, to identify. According to the theory of social identity 
(Tajfel, 1982), prejudices surface when, regardless of the reason, social 
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“categorisations” are activated i.e the processes of social divisions on the 
basis on ethnic (or any other) affiliation. This mostly happens at the time 
of sudden social changes and crises.  
 Having in mind the complexity of the former Yugoslavia, the existence 
of six republics (and two autonomous provinces within Serbia), in which 
different peoples lived, it is no wonder that the social crisis in time led 
to national homogenisation in individual republics. At first, there were the 
interests of Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and so on, but the homogenisation 
very soon turned them into the interests of individual peoples and not 
individual republics. Thus, in the second phase the focus was on the in-
terests of Serbs, Croats and so on. The conflict was not only inter-repub-
lic but inter-ethnic as well; the conflict both within republics and among 
the national entities on the former Yugoslav territory. This is the typical 
clash of patriotism and nationalism — the homogenisation in defence of 
the ethnicity wherever it may be. Applied to the other, fundamental aspect 
of the state crisis, that problem presented itself in the form of a dilemma: 
is the right to self-determination (including secession) the right of 
individual peoples or the right of the population living on a certain 
territory? Without getting into the concrete policies of policy-makers in 
individual republics-states1, all of them more or less employed double 
standards, depending on their concrete interests: from Serbia and its claims 
on parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of the 
“right to self-determination including secession” (but denying this right to 
the Albanians on Kosovo), to Croatia and its double standards when its 
territory or the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina are concerned. 
 In the first phase of the crisis there were internal migrations, largely in 
Serbia, or better to say on Kosovo; later, and mostly during the war, 
there were mass migrations and changes in the ethnic composition of the 
newly-created states. 
 During crises, individuals and groups seek explanations, the causes and 
the possible ways out. In the state of frustration and overall psychical agi-
tation, people are an easy prey for manipulation and focusing chagrin on 
culprits. The mediators between the political elites and the masses are 
mass media who very often (ab)use their position. By the negative selec-
tion of the information and the tendentious interpretations, “others” are 
demonised, their homogenisation is used to justify one’s own, their 
“privileges” serve as a source of dissatisfaction. 
 Crises and their manipulations in the media lead to the collective eth-
nic identification, in which an individual and their interests are lost, and 
what is left is only the ethnic group — alpha and omega of everything: 
 
 1The term republic-state is used for the period preceding the open conflict up 
to the adjudication of the international commission that sanctioned the right to 
self-determination of the republics of the former Yugoslavia.  
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affiliation, rights, self-awareness, self-righteousness, and the legitimacy of 
interests. Individuals exist through groups, groups give them confidence and 
legitimacy. The group identity always exists solely in relation to another 
group’s identity, the group that “endangers” us, our interests and even our 
survival. Those “others” (always minorities) are different, unadjusted, 
privileged, and intruders in the majority group. By their very existence, 
they are considered a threat in a period of crisis. 
 Within these universal processes, there is also the influence of certain 
dominating character traits, first of all, conformism, or the need to belong 
and enjoy support, and authoritarianism, or the need to be led. The end 
result of these processes is prejudice-based xenophobia, which surfaces in 
crises. 
 The aggressive Serbian nationalism was preceded by a long social crisis, 
fertile soil for ideological manipulation of the “Serbian national issue”, 
leading to the aggressive hegemonic policy and the ethnic cleansing of 
non-Serbian populations.  
 When analysing the changes in the attitudes toward the other national 
groups in Croatia, it should be kept in mind that this was a specific war, 
which resulted in extreme emotional agitation, when the behaviour is not 
only the consequence of people’s attitudes as relatively more permanent 
sentiments, but of situational variables as well i.e. war, death, destruction. 
One should not forget people’s propensity for the conformist types of be-
haviour and their desire to bring their behaviour and values in line with 
the behaviour and values of the majority. Besides, earlier studies showed 
that concrete instances of conflict among national groups give rise to the 
changes in the evaluation of “others”. Buchanan and Cantril (1953) studied 
the contents of the stereotypes that the Americans had about the 
Russians, both at the time of their close co-operation and alliance (1942) 
and during the intensification of the cold-war (1948). As expected, in the 
first study certain positive traits (hard-working 61% and brave 48%) 
dominated, while in the second study the dominant stereotype was — 
cruel 50%! 
 Even more dramatic changes and over an even shorter period of time 
occurred in an Indian study (Sinha and Upadhyaya, 1960). By coincidence, 
the first study was carried out on the eve of the conflict between India 
and China (1959), and the survey was repeated ten months later. While 
the dominant Chinese traits prior to the conflict, in the opinion of Indian 
students, were artistic sense (47%), religiosity (31%), diligence (24%), after 
the conflict there was a sudden turnabout in the content of the stereo-
type: the Chinese are aggressive (71%), deceitful (60%) and selfish (43%). 
 Certain behaviours in a crisis are to a large extent founded on a 
population’s character traits. In some earlier studies, which critically pre-
sented the research done in the field of inter-ethnic relations on the terri-
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tory of the former Yugoslavia, certain types of behaviour were predicted 
on the basis of such character traits.  
 In the critical review of the studies of inter-ethnic relations ([iber, 
1988), we noticed that various studies — using a miscellany of methodo-
logical approaches, numerous samples and covering the entire former 
Yugoslavia — showed that at least 10-15% of the people held latently ex-
treme nationalist views. It was difficult to decide whether these data were 
a cause for alarm at that time; nevertheless, we concluded that “if we 
take into account the sensitivity of inter-ethnic relations on Yugoslav terri-
tory, and the latent — and historically much too often openly manifested 
— tendency to manipulate the inter-ethnic relations to defuse social dis-
contents, plus the mostly authoritarian and conformist personality structure 
of the average man, then these data are not so marginal and indicate that 
in different social circumstances a part of the population would instigate 
inter-ethnic confrontations” (104). In line with this conclusion and by 
analysing the existing studies of the authoritarian personality structure we 
concluded that “the marked authoritarianism of the psychological build-up 
of our population poses a real danger for various influences gaining the 
upper hand, particularly at the time of social upheavals, insecurity and 
conflicts”. ([iber, 1989, p. 144). 
 
 The issues and the assumptions of the research 
 There are two central issues to this research: 
 1. Has — and to what extent — the attitude toward the members of 
the ethnic minorities in Croatia changed in view of the war;  
 2. to what extent the attitude toward the minorities is the variable of 
the “ideological” rift in the electoral bodies of political parties. 
The assumptions of the research ensue from these issues, with certain 
addenda: 
 a) wars, as an extreme method of settling conflicting interests among 
states, inevitably lead to national homogenisation and the intensification of 
negative attitudes toward the peoples engaged in the conflict; 
 b) negative attitude toward the members of a national group, accom-
panied with the national homogenisation, triggers off negative attitudes to-
ward other minority groups; 
 c) since the attitude toward minority groups is a component of the to-
tality of political weltanschaung (a greater openness toward the others is 
characteristic for the liberal worldview /which means “leftist” parties/, while 
national ostracism is a part of the conservative worldview /and of pre-
dominantly “rightist” parties/), significant differences within the electoral 
bodies of certain parties regarding minority groups were expected. 
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 The method 
 The attitude toward other national groups was examined by means of 
the Bogardus’ social distance scale; in the comparative part of the analysis 
only two, extreme, dimensions were included: the readiness to marry into 
another nationality and the acceptance of the fact that the members of 
other nationalities live together with us in our state. The readiness to 
marry indicates the lack of any negative attitude, since it is the most 
immediate, direct and intimate relation with a person. On the other hand, 
denying other nations the right to live with us on the same territory indi-
cates an extremely negative attitude, intolerance and exclusiveness.  
 Apart from the scale of social distance, which measures the behavioural 
component of the attitude, we have used three standard questions from 
the scale for measuring the attitudes toward the national — the value 
component. The focus of the analysis in this research is on social distance, 
while the other indicator serves as the controlling variable. 
 The study was carried out in the spring of 1997, on the eve of the 
elections for the House of Counties of the Croatian parliament and local 
self-government, on the sample of 1,168 respondents from four biggest 
Croatian cities.  
 
 The basic research findings up to 1990 
 We are going to review only two studies carried out on the territory 
of the former Yugoslavia, but in two totally different social and political 
periods. The first study (Panti}, 1967) carried out at the time of the still 
remarkable homogeneity of the Yugoslav territory, prior to the momentous 
events of 1968, and particularly those of 1971.2 This was still the time 
when the former system and its value superstructure enjoyed immense 
popular support, and when the concepts of “brotherhood and unity” and 
equality were fundamental values. The other study (To{ et. al., 1988) was 
carried out at the time of the economic crisis which had not yet reached 
the proportions of a serious political crisis.3 This is important to note in 
order to understand that the findings of these studies are the result of 
more permanent orientations, formed over a longer period of time, and 
that they are not contaminated with the current political processes. 
 
 2The year 1971 will be remembered as the year of the so called “Croatian 
spring” i.e. Croatia’s lobbying for changing the relations in the Yugoslav federation, 
for the bigger independence of republics, market economy and the elements of 
political pluralism. 
 3The study was carried out in 1986—87. The first spark of the crisis was 
probably the 8th Session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of 
Serbia in 1987. 
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 Judging by the findings from the second study, the mid-1980s witnessed 
the end of the illusion about the ethnically conflict-free society, and the 
data on the social distance are increasingly similar to those in other coun-
tries, US for example. In any case, it is thought that in relatively stable 
and conflictless Western societies, about 50% of the population is not 
ready to form close familial ties with the members of other ethnic groups 
(Triandis, 1965). This datum is also the criterion for appraising the find-
ings of our studies. Based on the research carried out at the time of the 
relatively stable functioning of the former Yugoslavia, the conclusion is 
that the ideologically promoted image of an ethnically conflict-free society 
was rapidly losing ground, and that a significant fraction of people in-
creasingly began to turn to the members of their own nation; this trend 
was noticeable everywhere in the world. 
 
Table 1. Comparative chart of the marked social distance in the two 
studies (in %) 
republic/province 1966 1987 
Voivodina  4 25 
Croatia 11 22 
Bosnia and Herzegovina  6 31 
Montenegro 13 26 
Serbia  11 30 
Kosovo 17 54 
Slovenia 40 42 
Macedonia 48 43 
 
 The results of the research after 1990 
 In the more recent wartime and post-wartime periods, three studies on 
social distance toward certain minority groups have been carried out in 
Croatia.4 
 In the study of the 1992 and 1995 elections, the social distance toward 
three, most interesting and relevant minority groups (in view of the politi-
cal and military hostilities) was analysed. Since Croatia was faced with the 
 
 4The studies were carried out on the eve of the elections for the Parliament or 
the bodies of local self-government, i.e. at the time of a more pronounced political 
participation — pre-election campaigns. This fact might have influenced the findings 
of the study only in the sense of a more explicit articulation of the respondents’ 
answers within the more general individual political attitudes.  
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internal uprising of a part of the Serbian population and with the Serbian 
aggression, it is understandable that the social distance toward the Serbs is 
most indicative. The social distance toward the Bosniac Muslims was also 
studied, since the relationship with them is most interesting and complex. 
On the one hand, they were considered Croatian allies against Serbia and 
the Serbs living on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and (by 
some) as “Croats of Muslim faith”; on the other hand, some bitter 
fighting flared up between Croats and Bosniac Muslims in some parts of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, along religious lines. The third group are the 
Albanians as the group with the greatest social distance on the entire ter-
ritory of the former Yugoslavia (Panti}, 1967, 1991; Jerbi} et al., 1982; 
To{ et al., 1988) and who were potential Croatian allies (an enemy of my 
enemy is a friend of mine!) In the 1997 study, the Albanians were re-
placed by the Italians as a typical minority group in Croatia with a similar 
cultural (Mediterranean-western-European) and religious (Catholic) tradition.  
 The 1992 research was carried out at the end of the open, all-out 
conflict with Serbia, the 1995 research immediately upon the termination 
of the last military operations for the liberation of parts of the Croatian 
territory, and the 1997 study after the peaceful reintegration of the re-
maining part of the Croatian territory. It had been expected that such 
situational variables would significantly influence the social distance toward 
certain minority groups. The answer to this may be found in the percent-
ages on Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Social distance toward certain minority groups 
Form of ties Serbs Bosniac Muslims Albanians Italians 
 1992 1995 1997 1992 1995 1997 199
2 
1995  1997 
living in my state 47,8 46,8 55,1 73,7 58,3 59,5 58,0 48,1  77,8 
being my 
neighbours 
37,5 38,4 46,5 69,4 55,1 55,9 49,1 41,1  81,7 
working together 38,3 37,7 45,1 69,6 53,7 53,9 50,9 41,4  78,2 
being friends 37,8 36,5 42,9 72,5 55,6 53,0 52,2 44,0  80,0 
being in-laws 20,7 17,2 21,3 32,5 18,4 23,4 21,0 13,0  48,2 
 
Note: These data refer to the percentages of the respondents who accept certain 
forms of social ties. 
 
 In the 1992 study, carried out during the war, the social distance to-
ward the Serbs rose dramatically; marriage-wise, the Serbs were as 
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(un)desirable as the Albanians. If the Albanians are — regretfully — 
taken as the measure of undesirability on the territory of the former 
Yugoslavia (like the black people in the US), we can conclude that those 
people who are unaccepting of the Albanians, do not accept the Serbs, 
either. In other words, only those without any prejudices at all, those who 
are emancipated enough to accept marriage with another person regardless 
of race, religion, or nationality, were ready for marrying a person of Ser-
bian nationality, even during the war. The negative attitude toward the 
Serbs remained at the same level (the percentage of the respondents 
ready to accept any social ties with the Serbs) throughout this period.5 It 
will be interesting, from both scientific and social point of view, to ob-
serve how this attitude is to evolve in the future and how much time will 
elapse before the level of the readiness to tie the knot reaches 50%, 
considered to be an acceptable standard. 
 
Figure 1.  Changes in the readiness to marry members of the Serbian and 
Bosniac Muslim minority 
 And while the readiness to get married is an indicator of the ultimate 
openness toward others, or in other words, the indicator of the non-exis-
tence of any social distance, the opposite extreme is the readiness to live 
in the same state with the members of other nations, religions, and races. 
This form of social distance has been seldom studied since it has been 
thought, both in Croatia and abroad, that this belongs to the past; this is 
why there are only the results of the three studies, all Croatian. 
 
 5Minor variations in 1997 were the result of the differences in the composition 
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 These data display considerable differences, which is the result of the 
social changes and the war. But the fact that over 50% of the Croatian 
respondents would not like to live in Croatia together with the Serbs, 
points to the depth of the crisis of inter-ethnic relations and the need for 
the creation of mutual confidence (of course, following the termination of 
the conflict and the elimination of its causes). The pronounced social dis-
tance toward the members of the other two national groups — the 
Bosniac Muslims and the Albanians — with whom, at least at the time of 
the 1992 study — there were no conflicts, also deserves attention. It 
seems that there is a sort of “stonewalling” at work here, closing within 
one’s own nation at the time of a crisis or a war, i.e. that the negative 
attitude toward a particular group is generalised toward “all those who are 
not us”. In other words, these data are the result of a real crisis and 
war, as well as of a latent tendency toward national exclusion and 
stonewalling. 
 
 Party preferences and social distance 
 Within a multi-party political system, political attitudes are directly 
linked with party choices. The attitude toward “the others” is a component 
of the comprehensive political outlook. Independent of the current political 
crisis, which intensifies these stances, there are still important differences 
in the expression of social distance among the voters of certain political 
parties. Certain indicators of this relationship were showed in an earlier 
work ([iber, 1993). 
 The following Table sums up the findings of three studies, carried out 
as part of the analyses of electoral processes in Croatia in 1992, 1995, 
and 1997. In the 1995 elections, some parties entered a coalition — 
“Sabor 1995” — so that the responses of the supporters of individual par-
ties making up that coalition cannot be analysed separately. The problem 
is even bigger since the data for 1992 and 1997 demonstrate significant 
differences in the social distance toward the non-Croatian groups among 
the voters of individual parties within this coalition. 
 In the table, the parties are included on the basis of the readiness of 
their voters for certain kinds of societal ties with the minority groups with 
which Croats directly clashed. Regardless of certain variations in the 
achieved results of individual parties, largely caused by the small number 
of respondents who opted for them, a marked consistency of the results 
in the three studied periods is evident. This consistency is above all evi-
dent in the fact that in all these periods, the line-up of the parties is 
almost identical and that basically it follows the line-up of the parties on 
the continuum “left-right”. According to the findings, the biggest readiness 
for co-existence and the closest social (familial) ties is manifested by the 
SDU and ASH voters, who are regarded (and even self-declared) as leftist 
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parties. Next are the SDP and regional parties’ voters.6 The parties of the 
centre (HSLS, HNS, and HSS) had average percentage values. HDZ sup-
porters are centre-right and HSP’s are on the extreme right.7 
 
Table 3. Social distance and party preference 
 co-existence marriage 
parties Serbs Bosniac Muslims Serbs Bosniac Muslims 
 92 95 97 92 95 97 92 95 97 92 95 97 
SDU 100 100 100 100 100 100 94 100 67 69 67 67 
ASH 90 77 91 93 69 82 80 69 80 79 46 70 
SDP 90 68 75 90 70 77 54 30 35 53 25 40 
REG 79 (60) 70 86 (71) 77 39 (28) 60 45 (28) 50 
HSLS 60 58 63 82 69 65 27 19 23 39 23 25 
HKDU 53 (69) * 84 (71) * 20 (28) * 16 (28) * 
HNS 52 (69) 54 78 (71) 77 20 (28) 23 31 (28) 15 
HSS 31 (60) 50 56 (71) 51 11 (28) 21 24 (28) 16 
HDZ 31  33 40 71 48 47 10 8 10 27 9 12 
 16  22 17 60 46 40 2 4 0 22 10 6 
Note: The parties for which the 1995 data are supplied in brackets were at the 
time in a coalition so that it is not possible to distinguish among the sup-
porters of individual parties.  
* No respondents chose the party in the 1997 survey! 
 
 Since the 1992 study was carried out when the war with the Serbs was 
already raging, we cannot find out how it influenced the readiness of the 
voters of individual parties for certain forms of social ties. However, the 
effect of the conflict is noticeable in the social distance toward the 
Bosniac Muslims, since the open conflict with them began in 1993. The 
review of the comparative data shows that — more or less — the social 
distance increased with the voters of all parties, and that the biggest in-
crease was with the voters on the right — those of HDZ and HSP. This 
can be seen in Figure 2, showing the data for the four typical parties in 
the Croatian political spectrum. 
 And while the changes in the attitude toward the Bosniac Muslims be-
tween 1986 and 1992 can be interpreted as an indirect effect of the na-
tional homogenisation and generalised antagonism toward other national 
 
 6Regional parties in these studies include: IDS, PGS and DA. 
 7HKDU is not included since the data are available solely for 1992. In 1995, 
that party was in a coalition, and in 1997 none of the respondents declared 
himself/herself as that party’s voter. 
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groups, due to the conflict with the Serbs, the changes after 1992 are the 
direct result of the conflict with Bosniac Muslims. 
 
Figure 2. Changes in the readiness to marry Bosniac Muslims 
 
 The 1997 social distance research 
 This study was carried out in a sort of the post-war period, i.e. the 
time when the outcomes of a war, the winners and losers, are known, 
when there is no possibility for new conflicts, when scores are settled, 
wounds healed, and the conditions for a normal, peacetime life created. 
The life with “others” is a component of everyday social relations and 
ties, but the war must have left some traumas. 
 The focus of this study was on the forms of social relations i.e. on the 
social distance toward particular groups. Unlike the earlier studies, we 
were interested in our attitude toward the Serbs, the group which Croatia 
was in war with and which is, regardless of all the migrational trends8 still 
the most numerous national minority in Croatia; the attitude toward the 
 
 8We are using the phrase “migrational trends” although this has been an 
exodus from Croatia of the members of a particular ethnic group triggered off by 
the war, whether through “auto-cleansing” i.e. a voluntary decision not to live in 
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Bosniac Muslims, with whom Croatia formed an uneasy alliance during the 
war: on the one hand, the co-operation imposed through the common 
peril and on the other the conflict due to the differing visions of the 
state structure of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the attitude toward the 
Italians who served as the control group for the Catholic tradition and the 
western-style European civilisation, very much like Croatia’s. 
 An elaborate scale of social distance was applied in the study: from 
the opinion whether a group should or should not live on the Croatian 
territory, to the readiness to enter the closest social tie — marriage. Since 
there is a total of 15 concrete indicators, we wanted to find out whether 
it was possible to reduce all these data into a smaller number of 
meaningful concepts. This was done by factor analysis9 and in this way 
three meaningful and interpretable factors were obtained. 
 
Table 4. Factor analysis of the social distance variables 
Relations with individual groups factor I factor II factor III 
Serbs — living in my state .7987   
Serbs — working together .7962  .3000 
Serbs — being my neighbours .7808   
Muslims — living in my state .7764   
Muslims — working together .7472 .3110  
Muslims — being my neighbours .7247   
Serbs — being friends .6279  .5163 
Muslims — being friends .5855  .4383 
Italians — being my neighbours  .8254  
Italians — working together  .8105  
Italians — being friends  .7785  
Italians — living in my state .4243 .6094  
Serbs — being in-laws .3652  .8234 
Muslims — being in-laws .3270  .8183 
Italians — being in-laws  .5086 .6497 
Percentage of the total variance 49,9% 11,4% 8,5% 
 
Note: The table includes only the saturations higher than .30! 
 
 9The orthogonal analysis with the Varimax rotation and the extraction Lambda 
1 criterion was used.  
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 Factor interpretation 
 These three abstracted factors explain almost 70% of the variance. This 
fact is the proof of the markedly developed and consistent relation. Factor 
I explains almost 50% of the total variance of the five different forms of 
social relations with the three minority groups; the Serbs, the Bosniac 
Muslims, and the Italians. It is interesting, however, that this factor 
contains only the variables of the relation between the Serbs and the 
Bosniac Muslims, while the variables of the relations with the Italians are 
contained in factor II. Having in mind the already mentioned data on the 
acceptability of certain forms of social ties with the mentioned peoples, we 
may conclude that factor I contains the attitudes toward the undesirable 
ethnic groups10; factor II the attitudes toward the desirable ethnic 
groups11. The desirability or the undesirability of a group in a society de-
pend on a cascade of historical, cultural and situational reasons (for more 
details, see Allport, 1954). As the results of the earlier studies show, in 
Croatia, in a stable social situation, this primarily depends on the histori-
cal and cultural (particularly religious) reasons. The findings of this study 
— differing a lot from the earlier ones — are surely caused by the situa-
tional reasons.  
 The reason that the first factor can explain such a big part of the to-
tal variance lies in the fact that it has been structured to up to 10 vari-
ables, while the second factor (11.4% of the total variance) covers only 
five variables. An outstandingly significant finding is that the attitudes to-
ward the Serbs and the Bosniac Muslims are extremely divided (50% ac-
cepting and 50% rejecting), while the attitude toward the Italians is ex-
tremely positive (about 80% accepting). 
 Factor III (explains 8.5% of the total variance) includes primarily the 
readiness for familial ties with minority groups, the closest form of social 
ties, which implies a lack of any distance toward the minority groups. 
 These three factors are the foundation for any future analytical attempt 
to find out which character traits of the Croatian citizens are linked with 





 10Presumably, a component of this factor would probably be the attitude toward 
the Albanians if the stance toward this group was the subject of the research.  
 11Again, presumably, a component of this factor would be the attitudes toward, 
for example, the Hungarians or the Austrians. 
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 Objective character traits and social distance 
 When the attitudes toward other social groups are concerned 
(particularly toward minority groups — ethnic, religious or racial) or, more 
generally, regarding prejudices, the first assumption is that prejudices origi-
nate in poor education, or special social status within a certain traditional 
culture (women, for example), or that the elderly are more prone to nur-
turing them than young people, who are regarded much more open. It is 
interesting, however, that the findings of this study do not confirm these 
assumptions. Admittedly, in strict statistical terms, significant differences do 
exist, but they are negligible12 to the point of social insignificance. This 
fact requires an explanation which is, it seems, threefold: 
 1. the results show that the social distance is so big that it has, in a 
way, become a universal feature of the whole society. The war, the com-
mon enemy, the homogenisation of the society, the conformist pressures — 
all this stimulates more or less uniform responses and the potential 
differences in the reactions, occurring in “normal” situations, are levelled 
off; 
 2. in certain historical periods (social crises, abrupt changes of political 
regimes, and alike) there are certain divisions in societies which are much 
more important for the analysis of political behaviour than the classical 
variables of individual social character traits. 
 3. in the development of any society there are events that affect peo-
ple’s opinions over the long haul, both politically and socially. In the case 
of Croatia this primarily means “political biographies” formed during 
World War II that divided the population along completely different lines 
([iber, 1997). 
 
 Values/individual political traits and social distance  
 In this analysis we are to focus on the three relevant character traits: 
religiosity, familial political biography and party choice and see to what 
extent they are linked with the expressed social distance. We are not go-
ing to analyse each form of social distance but limit ourselves to their 
concise indicators obtained through the factor analysis: general distance 
toward the Serbs and the Bosniac Muslims (factor I), general distance to-
ward the Italians (factor II), and the distance regarding marriages with the 
members of other nations (factor III).  
 
 
 12In this research we have decided to take into consideration only the 
connections higher than 0.15 i.e. those that explain the minimum of 2.25% of the 
total variance.  
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Table 5. Values and political traits and social distance 






religiosity .247 independent .324 
political biography .217 independent .175 
party choice .328 independent .246 
 
 The data from the table show that the social distance toward the 
Italians in Croatia is not a consequence of systematic value-oriented or 
political causes, but more of certain individual preferences which have not 
been covered by this study, and which probably cannot be analysed by 
means of such an approach.13 
 Concerning the other two factors we can see that all three analysed 
variables are significantly linked with social distance, though in different 
ways. This will be much clearer from the following tables. 
 
Table 6. Religiosity and social distance 
Form of religiosity 
Distance toward Serbs and 
Bosniac Muslims 
Readiness for marriage 
fervent believer 52.97 52.42 
habitual believer 49.09 51.38 
doesn’t know 49.01 46.64 
non-believer 45.97 44.00 
anti-religious 44.87 42.97 
 
Note: The data are shown here in the so called “standard figures”; AM 
(arithmetic mean) — 50, SD (standard deviation) — 10. Higher values in-
dicate greater social distance. 
 
 The influence of religiosity on the social distance is understandable. 
The confessional affiliation of both minority groups differs from that of 
the majority of the Croatian populace; thus, siding with one’s religion is 
on the one hand a factor of internal homogenisation, and on the other a 
factor of the differences regarding the others, including the creation of 
 
 13More appropriate methods are those of the in-depth psychology or heightened 
interview developed by R. Lane (1962) in the study of political ideologies. 
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social distance. This influence is even more evident in the category of the 
readiness to marry into minority groups since there are concrete obstacles 
if future spouses are of a different religion. 
 As might have been expected, those individuals (or their parents) with 
a “NOB” /partisans/ political biography show much more readiness for cer-
tain forms of social ties with minority groups, while those with an “NDH” 
/the pro-Nazi independent Croatian state during World War Two; U — 
ustashas, paramilitary voluntary units; D — regular army/ political biogra-
phy show a much bigger social distance. As was shown in an earlier work 
([iber, 1997), even fifty years after the dramatic events of World War II, 
the political choices of that time still affect current political attitudes and 
behaviours.  
 
Table 7. Political biography and social distance 
Political biography 
Distance toward Serbs 
and Bosniac Muslims 
Readiness for 
marriage 
“NOB” 47.47 47.87 
“NDH-U” 53.74 51.93 
“NDH-D” 52.73 52.77 
on several sides 48.27 50.74 
outside conflicts 48.94 49.03 
does not know 50.95 49.46 
 
Table 8. Party choice and social distance 
Party choice 
General distance toward 
Serbs and Bosiac Muslims
Distance toward 
marriages 
SDU 40.19 47.68 
ASH 45.87 38.78 
SDP 45.64 48.03 
Regional Parties 45.64 45.56 
HNS 48.56 51.18 
HSLS 48.75 50.47 
HSS 50.32 50.10 
HDZ 53.90 51.95 
HSP 56.41 53.21 
 These data are identical to those on Table 4 but are here shown more 
coherently. 
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 We have already shown the attitude of the voters of individual parties 
and their readiness to enter into two forms of social relations — co-exis-
tence on the same territory and marriage. Now we are going to show the 
relation between the party preferences and the two obtained factors: the 
general distance toward the Serbs and the Bosniac Muslims and the gen-
eral readiness for marrying into another minority group. 
 
 The regression model of the connection between values/political 
opinions and social distance toward minority groups 
 Since we have found out that there are three individual values/political 
opinions that are linked with the social distance toward the minority 
groups, the question is what the relation between them is, or to what ex-
tent each of these variables contributes to the established connections. On 
the basis of numerous studies it may be assumed that religiosity and party 
choice are interconnected; the religious people more often support the 
parties on the right end of the political spectrum, and the non-religious 
those on the left. In the mentioned paper we also found out that there is 
a connection between the political biography and the party preference. Let 
us see their inter-correlation: 
 
Table 9. The relationship between value/political variables  
 religiosity political biography 
party choice .370 .289 
religiosity — .309 
 
 As we can see, all the three variables connected with the social dis-
tance toward the minority groups are inter-connected so the question is to 
what extent their connection decreases or increases the total connection 
with the social distance. 
 Since we have earlier (by means of a factor analysis) reduced all the 
data to three basic indicators — the general distance toward the Serbs 
and the Bosniac Muslims, the general distance toward the Italians, and the 
distance toward marriages — it will be interesting to see whether these 
relations are identical or one form of the distance is more strongly linked 
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Table 10.  Regression relationship of values/political variables with social 
distance factors 
variables factor I factor II factor III 
religiosity .094 (.247.) independent .307 (.324) 
political biography .111 (.217) independent .084 (.175) 
party choice .244 (.328) independent .002 (.246) 
multiple correlation R .334 independent .341 
 
Note: Brackets contain the original correlations; outside the brackets are the par-
tial correlations, i.e. the connection among various variables with the criterial 
variable (social distance), controlling for the influence of the other two 
variables.  
 
 Three central findings are contained in this table.  
 1. as we have already shown, not only is factor II (general attitude 
toward the Italians) independent of any value/political orientation of the 
respondents, but even when combined, they do not make up for a statis-
tically significant connection; 
 2. by combining the three variables (political biographies, religiosity, and 
party preferences), the total correlation with the criterial variable has in-
creased only so slightly; 
 3. an analysis of the partial correlations shows a marked change in 
comparison with the initial correlations. This is probably the most impor-
tant finding of this research. Namely, it shows that the general social dis-
tance toward the Serbs and the Bosniac Muslims (factor I) is connected, 
above all, with the party (and, probably, the political) preferences of a re-
spondent, while the universally negative attitude toward marrying into an-
other ethnic group (factor III) stems primarily from the religiosity of the 
respondents. In other words, rejecting the idea of marrying into another 
ethnic group is the result of social, cultural, and traditional beliefs in a 
society; religion is one of the most important factors in this. One should 
bear in mind that religious doctrines in themselves (not only the Catholic) 
stand in the way of marrying members of other faiths or put certain re-
quirements therein. Nevertheless, and regardless of religiosity, and at the 
level of the general attitude14, people in general object to marriages be-
tween the members of similar communities, on the assumption that in this 
 
 14We speak of the “general” attitude as opposed to the concrete behaviour 
since the classical psychological studies show that there is a significant difference 
between the verbal responses (like those in such studies) and the behaviour in 
concrete situations (LaPiere, 1934). 
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way possible conflicts and misunderstandings caused by social and cultural 
differences might be avoided. Thus, unlike factor I (general social distance 
toward the Serbs and the Bosniac Muslims), the dislike for marrying out-
side one’s ethnic group should not be interpreted as an a priori negative 
attitude toward the “others”, but more like a desire to bond with the 
members of one’s own group — the reasons being the observance of re-
ligious norms and the fear of possible baneful influence of these 
differences. 
 
 The attitude toward the national as a general dimension 
 In our analysis so far, we have focused on the problems of the social 
distance toward specific minority groups. Now we are interested in the 
general attitude toward the national or, in other words, in the national 
openness vs. national seclusion. As we have already mentioned, we took 
only three statements, which we thought would best illustrate the dimen-
sion we were looking into. The following table includes the responses on 
the acceptance-refusal scale. 
 











Best that members of one 














One should return to the 
tradition and the original 
values of one’s own people 
10.9 8.4 30.3 14.4 36.0 3.56 
At the end of 20th century 















 In short, the responses indicate that a great majority of the respon-
dents are against national seclusion (67% vs 12.4%)15, against that only 
the members of one nation live in one state (51.4% vs 26%), but at the 
same time they are for the return to the original values of their people 
 
 15For the sake of clarity, we combined the responses “agree completely” and 
“agree” on the one hand, and on the other “disagree completely” and “disagree”, 
leaving out the “do not know” response. 
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(50.4% vs 19.3%). The responses express a desire for national openness 
with a pronounced craving for traditionality.16 
 By applying the factor analysis to these three statements, we got a 
single common factor which explains 50% of the common variance, while 
the connection of individual statements with the factor ranges from 0.67 to 
0.77, the standard value for this type of research. 
 A comparison of the percentages of the responses advocating national 
seclusion in this study with those from the earlier studies shows that the 
percentage of the respondents who opt for a bigger national seclusion has 
slightly increased (in the earlier studies the percentage was about 15%; 
see [iber, 1988), but these changes are much smaller than the changes 
revealed in the study of social distance. 
 It showed that all the analysed variables, both objective and those 
value/political, are linked with the general value attitude toward the na-
tional; the connections remain significant within the regression analysis as 
well, which testifies to the independent contribution of each of these vari-
ables to the understanding of the attitude toward the national, as can be 
seen from the following table. 
 
Table 12. Regression relationship with the attitude toward the national  
variable connection partial connection 
party choice .309 .228 
religiosity .243 .203 
education .124 .135 
political biography .198 .108 
age .052 .081 
multiple correlation R  .472 
 
Note:  The direction of the connection is not included, since this is related to the 
construction of a variable. 
 
 All these connections, even those smaller than .10, are statistically sig-
nificant. What is significant about these data is that their combined con-
tribution (i.e. their connection with the criterial variable — the attitude 
toward the national) — is R .472! In other words, it means that although 
these variables explain only a little more than 10% (10.39%) of the total 
 
 16Similar results were obtained in an international study of historical awareness 
of young people (Šiber, 1996). 
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variance of the social distance, in this case they explain as much as 22.3% 
of the total variance of the attitude toward the national. 
 
 Conclusion 
 The results of the research, juxtaposed with the data from the earlier 
studies of the same issues, unequivocally and unambiguously confirmed that 
the war has brought about the change in the attitudes of the people 
toward the minority ethnic groups. These changes are not exclusively di-
rected toward the minority — Serbian — group with which the majority 
— Croatian — group was at war, but the generalised negative attitude 
toward all other ethnic minority groups. This is the proof of the assump-
tion that the national homogenisation, as the result of a conflict with an-
other national group, inevitably creates distance toward all those who are 
not “us”. Thus we can speak of two phases in boosting the social dis-
tance, triggered off by military conflicts. The data related to the social 
distance toward the Bosniac Muslims prove the same. In the first phase, 
the conflict with the Serbs broadened the social distance toward them as 
the result of the homogenisation of the Croats, while in the second that 
distance greatly increased (to the level of the social /un/acceptability of the 
Serbs) as the result of a concrete conflict with that ethnic group. 
 Since we had at our disposal the findings of the studies with the same 
subject in relatively “normal” circumstances, we may formulate another ex-
tremely important and far-reaching conclusion. Namely, the studies carried 
out before 1990 showed that the percentage of the respondents with ex-
treme views of others is about 15%. In the studies after 1990, carried out 
during and after the war, we found out that only about 20% of the re-
spondents are still open toward everybody, regardless of the minority. In 
other words, the greatest number of the respondents (and probably, of the 
whole population) are people without the unambiguously articulated 
opinions toward the others, i.e. individuals who change their preferences 
according to the changes in social conditions. This group is usually called 
the “silent majority”; it “sways” in their political preferences, often without 
a clear and articulate political opinion, is an easy prey to manipulation, 
acts in line with immediate problems, choices, and feelings, and not with 
long-term interests, goals, and stable internalised value preferences. It will 
be interesting to see to what extent the actual conflicts have been 
“instilled” into people’s consciousness and how much time will be needed 
for the social distance pendulum to swing back.  
 The findings have also shown that one cannot always speak of social 
distance as a universal dimension17, but that we can distinguish (as in our 
 
 17B. Jerbi} and S. Luki} (1982) in their analysis of the social distance of high-
school youth got, by means of the factor analysis, only one universal social 
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case) between the political social distance (rejection of others as the result 
of the totality of political preferences) and the traditional/cultural social 
distance (expressed as the refusal to marry into other ethnic groups). The 
quieting down of the general political situation is probably going to allevi-
ate the political social distance, while the traditional/cultural distance is 
going to remain, like in other countries.  
 The finding which shows that there has been a relatively small change 
in the opinion as a more permanent attitude toward the national, can be 
expressed as follows: social changes — primarily the war and the destruc-
tion — have provoked rejection of certain forms of co-existence with mi-
nority groups, above all with those who Croatia was in conflict with, but 
that did not greatly influence the general value orientation, i.e. the atti-
tude toward the national. 
 Since the combination of demographic and value/political variables de-
fines the general attitude toward the national to a greater extent than it 
defines the social distance toward particular minority groups, it could be 
concluded that the attitude toward the national is much more stable and 
that it is to a great extent conditioned by some relatively permanent and 
stable character traits, while the social distance is much more influenced 




distance factor which might be interpreted as ethnocentrism — seclusion and 
rejection of others. However, their research was carried out in “peacetime”. 
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